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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a claim for economic loss against the Idaho State Department of 
Agriculture ("ISDA") for losses sustained by Peter Renzo ("Renzo"), d/b/a S.A.B.R.E. Foundation, 
Inc., ("SABRE) following ISDA's refusal to grant a propagation permit and demand that SABRE 
spay and neuter its SiberianTigers and other big cats before entering into the State of Idaho. SABRE 
suffered severe economic losses as a result of ISDA's decision which was determined to be unlawful, 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion by Judge Ted V. Wood inBingham County. SABRE 
filed a Tort Claim against ISDA and then a lawsuit for economic loss. ISDA filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the lawsuit, which was granted by Judge Darren B. Simpson in the form of an Order 
granting summary judgment. SABRE appeals Judge Simpson's decision. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
S.A.B.R.E. Foundation, Inc ("SABRE") filed a Tort Claim against the Idaho State 
Department of Agriculture, ("ISDA") on or about May 14,2008. R. Vol. I, p. 12 - 18,212 - 218. 
SABRE filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against ISDA on October 6,2008. R. Vol. I, 
p. 3. ISDA filed a Notice of Appearance on November 26,2008. R. Vol. I, p. 1. 
On January 5, 2009, ISDA filed its Motion To Dismiss with supporting memorandum and 
affidavits. R. Vol. I, pp. 1, 19. On April 7 2009, SABRE filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R. Vol. I, p. 51. On April 14,2009, IDSA filed its Reply Brief in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss. R. Vol. I, p. 1. The hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was 
held on April 2!, 2009. R. Vol. I, p. 2. Curing the hearing, the parties stipulated to hearing the 
matter as a summary judgment motion. R. Vol. I, p. 223. 
The district court issued its Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Defendant on May 27,2009. R. Vol. I, p. 219. Judgment was also entered on May 27,2009. R. 
Vol. I, p. 251. SABRE file a Notice of Appeal on July 7, 2009. R. Vol. I, p. 254. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Backmound 
Plaintiff Peter Renzo founded the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation for the purpose of preserving 
Siberian Tigers and other big cats. S.A.B.R.E. stands for "Siberians Are Becoming Rapidly 
Extinct." Affidavit of Peter Renzo, R. Vol. I, p. 86. The Foundation is adamantly dedicated to the 
education of children and the general public about these tigers, and to do whatever possible to 
prevent their extinction. Nielson Affidavit, Exhibit 1, Agency Record, R. Vol. I, p. 116. 
It is estimated that the wild population of Siberian Tigers currently totals 350 - 400 tigers. 
These tigers are threatened with total annihilation due to poaching and habitat loss from logging and 
development. R. Vol. I, p. 116. Peter Renzo has worked with tigers for over 30 years and is one of 
the most experienced tiger behaviorists in the world. R. Vol. I, pp. 87, 116. 
It was and is absolutely necessary, as part of S.A.B.R.E. Foundation's mission and purpose, 
in preserving the Siberian tiger species, that the Foundation be allowed to breed its cats. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 86 -87. Breeding and exhibition of the cats in captivity helps to repopulate the species and bring 
awareness of and education about endangered species, all of which helps to preserve the species in 
the wild. R. Vol. I, pp. 86-87. 
In 1991, Renzo obtained a permit from Idaho Fish and Game to bring four Siberian tigers and 
one leopard into the State of Idaho for breeding and exhibition. These plans didn't materialize as 
he was not able to secure the property he needed to locate in Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 87. In 2007, the 
S.A.B.R.E Foundation planned to bring its cats into the State of Idaho to show and breed them, as 
well as educate the general population about the cats and the efforts being made to keep the species 
from going extinct. R. Vol. I, p. 87 
Renzo obtained assurances from First Nationwide Financial Group, Inc. that it could acquire 
the necessary funding of approximately $8,000,000.00 for a 50 acre tiger habitat and a60room hotel, 
restaurant, educational facility and a vet hospital. The Foundation's plan was to preserve the big cat 
species and educate the population about the endangered species. R. Vol. I, p. 87. 
SABRE began curtailing its operations in Nevada because Renzo had reviewed Idaho's rules 
and regulations and concluded that SABRE could satisfy all the criteria necessary to bring the cats 
into the State and breed them. Additionally, S.A.B.R.E. Foundation had to move because the 
property Renzo had rented in Nevada was being sold. R. Vol. I, p. 88. 
In October, 2007, Renzo submitted an application for a Deleterious Exotic Animal 
Possession permit to the Department of Agriculture. He submitted the Deleterious Exotic Animal 
Permit Form, his Class C Exhibitor's License from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, a Renewal 
form showing that Renzo's Exhibitor's License had been properly renewed, and a copy of a letter 
from the I.R.S. showing the 501(c)(3) status of the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation. R. Vol. I, pp. 88, 105- 
113. IZenzo addressed his application to Dr. ?dark Grew. Cr. Grew was a veterinarian empioyed 50 
percent of the time by the Department of Agriculture and fifty percent of the time by the Department 
of Fish & Game. R. Vol. I, p. 135, Deposition of Dr. Greg Ledbetter, taken March 26, 2009, 
('Ledbetter Depo.") p. 54, LL. 20 - 24. Dr. Drew was supervised by Dr. Greg Ledbetter, 
Administrator of the Division of Animal Industries for the Department of Agriculture. On October 
9,2007, Dr. Drew sent the application to Joelene, an Agriculture Department employee who also 
worked under Dr. Ledbetter. R. Vol. I, pp. 104, 135, Ledbetter Depo., p. 55, LL. 4 - 5. Joelene, 
described as the Department's compliance officer, handled most of the initial requests for 
importation of animals into Idaho and was the initial contact in the application process. She then 
sent the exotic deleterious permit applications directly to Dr. Ledbetter. R. Vol. I, p. 135, Ledbetter 
Depo. p. 55, LL. 13 - 16. 
Until his appointment as Administrator for the Division of Animal Industries in November 
2005, Dr. Ledbetter's career had centered exclusively around cattle. Before commg to Idaho, he had 
practiced veterinary medicine for the dairy cattle industry in California. R. Vol. I, p. 127, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 11. LL. 14 - 19. After moving to Idaho, he practiced veterinary medicine in Idaho and 
managed a dairy herd initially owned by his wife and her father. R. Vol. I, pp. 127 - 128, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 12, LL. 10 - 25, p. 13, LL. 1 - 8. 
Dr. Ledbetter started working as Administrator of the Division of Animal Industries on 
December 6,2005. R. Vol. I, p. 130, Ledbetter Depo., p. 25, LL. 24 - 25; p. 26, LL. 1 - 2. He had 
no involvement, no association, andno connection whatsoever with any group or individual dealing 
with exotic animals. P,. Vol. !, p. 130, Ledbetter Depo., p. 25, LL. ?7 - 23. During his tenure as 
Administrator, Dr. Ledbetter saw less than a half a dozen requests to import deleterious exotic 
animals in to the State. This number included Renzo's application. R. Vol. I, p. 131, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 29, LL. 24 - 25; p. 30, LL. 1 - 6. 
There was written protocol in Dr. Ledbetter's department for the handling of deleterious 
exotic animal permits. R. Vol. I, p. 135, Ledbetter Depo., p. 56, LL. 15 - 18. After Joeline brought 
the application to Dr. Ledbetter, he viewed the page in which Renzo identified the S.A.B.R.E 
Foundation as a "501~3 foundation for the endangered Siberian Tigers and other big cats". R. Vol. 
I, pp. 105, 136, Ledbetter Depo., p. 57, LL. 8 - 15. 
On this same page, Renzo stated that he had been U.S.D.A. licensed for over 30 years 
without a problem and that he had a Fish and Game license for his animals previously. R. Vol. I, 
p. 105. Handwritten notes on the page include "Education - open to public for viewing", "similar 
to YBW [Yellowstone Bear Worldj", and "- trained pe~ormance to public". R. Vol. I, p. 105. 
Dr. Ledbetter did not believe that Renzo's previous permit from the Department of Fish and 
Game was involved in any way in his decision to require spaying and neutering. R. Vol. I, p. 137, 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 63, LL. 20 - 24. There was nothiig in the Fish & Game permit about spaying 
and neutering. R. Vol. I, p. 138, Ledbetter Depo., p. 65, LL. 8 - 10. Furthermore, Dr. Ledbetter did 
not review Renzo's application for renewal of his U.S.D.A. license when he reviewed Renzo's 
possession application. R. Vol. I, p. 138, Ledbetter Depo., p. 65, LL. 20 - 25; p. 66, LL. 1 - 3. 
As part of the review process, Dr. Ledbetter spoke with Dr. Steve Drlica, the doctor 
mentioned inRenzo7s letter to Dr. Drew. R. Vol. I, p. 138, Ledbetter Depo., p. 67, LL. 11 - 13. Dr. 
Ledbetter verified with Dr. Drlica that Renzo had a U.S.D.A. license and learned that Renzo had 
experienced no problems as an operator. R. Vol. I, p. 138, Ledbetter Depo., p. 67, LL. 16 - 25. 
Neither Dr. Ledbetter nor anyone from his office spoke with Renzo's neighbors or with any other 
third party regarding Renzo's application. R. Vol. I, p. 138, Ledbetter Depo., p. 68, LL. 1- 8, 14 - 
17. Joelene did perform an internet search on S.A.B.R.E. as well as Renzo and found no significant 
complaints recorded there. R. Vol. I, p. 139, Ledbetter Depo., p. 69, LL. 2 - 7. 
Dr. Ledbetter was familiar with Yellowstone Bear World and had a lot of interaction with 
its owner. Dr. Ledbetter thought it was reasonable for the owner to charge entry fees as he was a 
businessman. R. Vol. I, p. 139, Ledbetter Depo., p. 71, LL. 2 - 13. Dr. Ledbetter understood Peter 
Renzo to be a businessman. R. Vol. I, p. 139, Ledbetter Depo., p. 71, LL. 16 -18. He also 
understood that Renzo's operation would be open to public viewing. R. Vol. I, p. 139, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 71, LL. 22 - 25; p. 72, L. 1. 
Dr. Ledbetter recognized no evidence that Renzo's tiger breeding would somehow benefit 
tigers in the wild. Dr. Ledbetter decided that Renzo wanted to breed the tigers for his own benefit, 
and that was it. R. Vol. I, p. 140, Ledbetter Depo., p. 73, LL. 12 - 19. Dr. Ledbetter did not talk to 
any third party about the benefits to the species if Renzo propagated his tigers. R. Vol. I, p. 140, 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 73, LL. 21 - 23. 
Dr. Ledbetter met with Joelene and Dr. Drew to review Renzo's application. R. Vol. I, p. 
140, Ledbetter Depo., p. 74, LL. 19 - 24. Dr. Drew expressed Fish & Game's concern about having 
deleterious exotic animals in Idaho and their escape. R. Vol. I., p. 140, Ledbetter Depo., p. 75, LL. 
3 - 6. The issue of Ligertown was raised in the discussions. Dr. Ledbetter believed that Ligertown 
was the impetus for the Legislature taking the action that they did. R. Vol. I, p. 140, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 75, LL. 7 - 20. The similarity that Dr. Ledbetter found between Renzo's operation and 
Ligertown was that Renzo was asking for a permit to propagate tigers and Ligertown had propagated 
lions and tigers and caused a major problem. R. Vol. I, p. 140, Ledbetter Depo., p. 75, LL. 21 -25; 
p. 76, LL. 1 - 4. 
Ligertown consisted of a ramshackle collection of pens and cages just outside Lava Hot 
Springs. R. Vol. I, p. 150. In late September, 1995, 19 African lions were shot after some of them 
escaped. Authorities removed lions and lion-tiger hybrids along with more than40 wolf-dog hybrids 
from the cages. R. Vol. I, p. 150. In January, 1996, legislation was introduced to "take care of the 
Ligertown situation." R. Vol. I, p. 150. 
Dr. Ledbetter understood the post-Ligertown adopted rules to mean that without the 
administrator's authority, noone, including zoos and exhibitors, could possess or propagate 
deleterious exotic animals. Dr. Ledbetter knew of no exemptions for zoos. R. Vol. I, pp. 133 -134. 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 48, LL. 4 - 25; p. 49, LL. 1,7 - 16. 
Dr. Ledbetter didn't believe that the rules pertaining to deleterious exotic animals actually 
required spaying and neutering. R. Vol. I, p. 132, Dr. Ledbetter Depo., p. 43, LL. 2 - 6. Dr. 
Ledbetter believed that propagation was discouraged under the rules except under "extreme 
circumstances". R. Vol. I, p. 132, Ledbetter Depo., p. 43, LL. 15 - 16. In his duties as 
Administrator, the only way to prohibit propagation was to require spaying and neutering. R. Vol. 
I, p. 132, Ledbetter Depo., p. 43, LL. 17 - 19. Dr. Ledbetter rejected separation as an effective means 
of prohibiting propagation, stating that "[tlhere isno guarantee that you can keep animals separated." 
R. Vol. I, p. 132, Ledbetter Depo., p. 43, LL. 20- 24. Dr. Ledbetter had no knowledge to disagree 
with the representation that the statute pertaining to deleterious exotic animals does not include the 
words "spay" or "neuter". R. Vol. I, p. 134, Ledbetter Depo., p. 50, LL. 11 - 18. 
During Dr. Ledbetter's tenure as Adrninstrator, a lion cub was born at the Tautphaus Park 
Zoo in Idaho Falls, of which Dr. Ledbetter was not aware. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ledbetter Depo., p. 86, 
LL 23 - 25; p. 87, LL. 1 - 12; R. Vol. I, p. 152. The zoo anticipated many visitors as a result of the 
display of the new lion cub. R. Vol. I, p. 152. The zoo superintendent was quoted as saying that the 
lion cub was " a part of the bigger picture and that is to preserve the species." R. Vol. I, p. 152. 
To Dr. Ledbetter's knowledge, the Tautphaus Park Zoo did not obtain a permit for the 
propagation of deleterious exotic animals under his or any other administration. R. Vol. I, pp. 142- 
143. Ledbetter Depo., p. 84, LL. 25; p. 85, LL. 1 - 7. Dr. Ledbetter didn't know of any breeding 
programs of any zoos for deleterious exotic animals during his administration. R. Vol. I, p. 183, 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 85, LL. 8 - 12. To his recollection, he didn't even think about the fact that there 
may be breeding in the zoos. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ledbetter Depo., p. 85, LL. 13 - 16. 
During his deposition, Dr. Ledbetter was presented with a newspaper article entitled, "New 
Lion at Tautphaus Park Zoo. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ledbetter Depo., p 88, LL. 16 - 22; R. Vol. I, p. 154. 
According to the article, the new lion had been successfully introduced to the zoo's female lion and 
the zoo hoped that the lion pair would eventually produce cubs. R. Vol. I, p. 154. Dr. Ledbetter did 
not recall anything about the importation of the male lion into the zoo. R. Vol. I, p. 144, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 89, LL. 3 - 6. 
Dr. Drew was responsible, as the wildlife veterinarian for checking out the zoos. R. Vol. I, 
p. 143, Ledbetter Depo., p. 85, LL. 17 - 19. According to Dr. Ledbetter, if there was a violation of 
the rules, Dr. Drew would have reported it to him. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ledbetter Depo., p. 86, LL. 1 - 
4. Dr. Ledbetter did not recall any report of zoos during his administration. R. Vol. I, p. 143, 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 86, LL. 20 - 22. 
On October 17, 2007, Dr. Ledbetter sent a letter to Renzo requiring the S.A.B.R.E. 
Foundation to spaylneuter its cats before bringing them into the State of Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 114. 
Dr. Ledbetter testified in his deposition that the spaylneuter requirements were included in his 
October 2007 letter to be consistent with the Department of Agriculture's decision in a case 
involving a man named Jerry Korn. R. Vol. I, p. 141, Ledbetter Depo., p. 78, LL. 1 - 5. Ledbetter 
indicated that they wanted to make sure the Renzo matter was consistent with the Korn decision 
"because they were very similar circumstances." R. Vol. I, p. 148, Ledbetter Depo., p. 106, LL. 12 - 
20. 
Jerry L. Korn ("Korn") operated an Idaho non-profit corporation named "For the Birds". R. 
Vol. I, p. 170. Korn's facility was neither a facility accredited by the AZA (Association of Zoos and 
Aquariums) nor a USDA licensed facility. R. Vol. I, p. 171. Korn actually LOST his exhibitor's 
license from the USDA as well as his Large Commercial Wildlife Facility License from Fish and 
Game. R. Vol. I, p. 156. 
Kom's operation was registered with ISDA as a domestic Cervidae ranch, possessing sixteen 
(16) elk. R. Vol. I, p. 174. However, Korn also possessed approximately eight (8) tigers, whom he 
confined at his facility, none of which had been declared by Korn on a declaration of deleterious 
exotic animals. R. Vol. I, pp. 171, 172. Korn then bred his tigers without appropriate permits and 
a tiger cub was bom in May of 2005. Korn gave the cub to a person who did not operate a 
deleterious exotic animal permitted facility in Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 172. 
Personal visits were made to Kom's facilities, notices and letters were sent to Kom, but Korn 
continued to violate the law. R. Vol. I, p. 172 - 173. It was not until February 15,2006, that Korn 
finally submitted an application for a possession permit for his tigers. R. Vol. I, p. 173. The 
application was denied, however, due to Kom's failure to comply with the requirements as directed 
by the ISDA. R. Vol. I, pp. 173, 174. Korn continued to violate the law and moved the tigers to 
another facility without appropriate permits. R. Vol. I, pp. 174 - 176. Korn also failed to comply 
with State requirements pertaining to his domestic cervidae ranch. R. Vol. I, pp. 174, 177 - 178. 
During his deposition, Dr. Ledbetter stated that he understood that the Depxtment of 
Agriculture demanded that Korn spay and neuter his tigers as a requirement of his possession permit 
-10- 
due the "statute that strictly regulates the propagation of exotic deleterious animals". Dr. Ledbetter 
recalled that Ph. Korn had illegally imported his tigers and that those tigers had bred and produced 
at least one cub that the Department of Agriculture knew about. R. Vol. I, pp. 130,132, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 28, LL. 15 - 24; p. 44, LL. 19 - 24. The Kom situation actually involved the death of the 
tiger cub illegal bred at Kom's facilities. R. Vol. I, pp. 133 - 134. In sum, Korn illegally possessed 
tigers, illegally bred tigers, illegally transferred his tigers, illegally gave a tiger cub to a person not 
authorized by the State to possess the tigers and failed miserably in cooperating with the State. 
Renzo had complied with all of the requirements set forth in the rules and received a response 
that was in no way shape or form in accordance with the rules. Furthermore, Dr. Ledbetter's 
response was by no means complete. Dr. Ledbetter failed to give any explanation whatsoever as to 
why the Siberian tigers, the endangered species that the Foundation was trying to save, would have 
to be spayed and neutered. He provided no reason why the Foundation's cats could not be bred in 
the State of Idaho. He made no observations about the Foundation's facilities, about Renzo's 
Exhibitor's license from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or about Renzo's abilities to breed to 
exhibit the cats. R. Vol. I, p. 89. 
When Renzo submitted the application for possession of the Foundation's cats, he had not 
submitted a propagation permit application because he had not been told that he had to do so. R. 
Vol. I, p.88. Once Renzo leamed of the contents of the October 17 letter, he called Dr. Ledbetter 
and spoke with him for the first time. He asked him about spaying and neutering and about the 
Foundation's breeding programs. Dr. Ledbetter told him that he did not give breeding licenses to 
individuals. R. Vol. I, p. 89. Renzo informed Dr. Ledbetter that he had a Class C exhibitor's license 
and according to Idaho's statutes, he was allowed to breed. Renzo told him &at his cats were 
critically endangered. Renzo couldn't help but ask himself why the Department of Agriculture 
would want to castrate an endangered animal. R. Vol. I, pp. 89 - 90. 
Renzo asked Dr. Ledbetter about the zoos who were breeding in the State of Idaho and Dr. 
Ledbetter said that he wasn't concerned about zoos. R. Vol. I, pp. 89 - 90. Renzo again reiterated 
that the Foundation's licensing was the same as that used for zoos and that the Foundation also 
wanted to bring business to the community. The Foundation's goal was to bring in money through 
tourism, a hotel and tiger show which would have been mutually beneficial while raising awareness 
about the plight of the magnificent endangered tiger. R. Vol. I, pp. 89-90. Dr. Ledbetter said again 
that he couldn't give licenses to individuals but that he would have to check with the attorney general 
to see if he could do so but that he didn't expect any exceptions to the rule being made. Dr. 
Ledbetter never called Renzo back. R. Vol. I, pp. 89-90. 
About a week after Renzo's phone call with Dr. Ledbetter, Rebecca Harris of the Foundation 
called Dr. Ledbetter. Affidavit of Rebecca Harris. R. Vol. I, p. 97. Rebecca wanted to make sure 
that Dr. Ledbetter was aware that by askmg the Foundation to spay and neuter endangered species 
without just cause, the Foundation would be in violation of federal law. Rebecca had done a great 
deal of research on Idaho statutes and regulations, trying to find some justification for Dr. 
Ledbetter's requirements, and was hoping he could explain his demands for spaying and neutering. 
R. Vol. I, p. 97. She also hoped that once she explained to Dr. Ledbetter that the Foundation was 
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an education and breeding facility and that it's preservation efforts required breeding, he might be 
willing to work with the Foundation. R. Vol. i, p. 97. 
Rebecca told Dr. Ledbetter that the Foundation had an investor lined up who wanted to build 
a facility that would be open to the public, similar to Bear World, with a Tiger theme that would 
bring tourism and business to the community. R. Vol. I, p. 97. Dr Ledbetter informed Rebecca that 
he wasn't trying to stop the Foundation from coming into Idaho and that Foundation was welcome 
as long it spayed and neutered the cats. Rebecca told him that the Foundation couldn't do that as it 
was against federal law and would utterly defeat any preservation or breeding programs attempted 
by the Foundation, which was part of the Foundation's mission statement. Dr. Ledbetter replied that 
it wasn't his problem. R. Vol. I, p. 97. 
During his conversation with Rebecca, Dr. Ledbetter made reference to Renzo's application 
being for a private individual and that breeding couldn't be allowed for that classification. R. Vol. 
I, pp. 97 - 98. Rebecca then pointed out to Dr. Ledbetter that the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation Inc. was 
not only a federally recognized 501(c)(3) but that Renzo carried a Class C Exhibitors license, the 
same that is carried by most zoos. Therefore, Renzo's application could not be interpreted or 
construed as being for a private individual. Dr. Ledbetter said that it didn't make any difference, a 
propagation permit couldn't be approved because he "just couldn't make any exceptions". R. Vol. 
I, pp. 97 - 98. 
Rebecca pointed out to Dr. Ledbetter that the statutes allowed breeding for licenses of their 
classification and then Dr. Ledbetter pointed out the last sentence in the statute which gave his 
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position discretionary control over the granting of those licenses. R. Vol. I, p. 98. Dr. Ledbetter 
mentioned the Ligertown incident which had made them cautious and they couldn't allow any 
exceptions. Rebecca replied that exceptions had already been made, as they had spoken to several 
comparable facilities and found that those facilities were actively breeding deleterious exotic animals 
in the State of Idaho. Dr. Ledbetter replied that it was okay for the zoos to breed such animals. 
Rebecca again pointed out that their Class C exhibitor's license made the Foundation, in essence, 
a zoo also. Dr. Ledbetter did not respond except for reiterating what was in the letter, that they could 
to come to Idaho if they spayed and neutered all of their animals. R. Vol. I, p. 98. 
Rebecca left the conversation baffled and feeling like she had asked "why are you pickimg 
on us?" and got the response "Because I can." R. Vol. I, p. 98. During his deposition, Dr. Ledbetter 
could not recall any conversation with Becky Harris whatsoever. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ledbetter Depo. 
P. 83, LL. 8 -12. 
In light of Dr. Ledbetter's hostile actions toward SABRE, Peter Renzo subsequently obtained 
counsel in Idaho to obtain a propagation permit. On November 2, counsel sent a letter to Dr. 
Ledbetter which stated in part: 
I have not been presented with any information whatsoever which 
would preclude Peter Renz0tS.A.B.R.E. Foundation from being 
issued a breeding permit. If you have such information, 1 would 
greatly appreciate receiving it. lfyou have actually denied or plan 
to deny the issuance o f a  breedingpermit, I hereby request that you 
submit to me a written denial, with a detailed explanation for the 
basis of such denial within seven days of the date of this letter. . . . 
Please indicate whether such is afinal agency decision so that we 
may proceed with remedies through litigation if necessary (emphasis 
added). 
R. Vol. I, p. 116. 
On November 16, 2007, Dr. Ledbetter sent a letter to Renzo's counsel absolutely and 
unequivocally refitsing to grant a propagation permit. Dr. Ledbetter stated as follows: 
Given the Legislature's clear direction, as well as the rule, ISDA will 
not issue a Propagation Permit. I also re-affirm the decision set 
forth in my Octoberl7, 2007 correspondence. ISDA will issue a 
Possession Permit to your client, but only if the following five 
requirements are met. 
* * * 
2) Your client provides documentation from an accredited 
veterinarian that all female tigers proposed to be moved into Idaho 
have been spayed prior to shipment 
3) Your client provides documentation from an accredited 
veterinarian that alimale tigers proposed to be moved into Idaho have 
been neutered prior to shipment (emphasis added). 
R. Vol. I, pp. 117-118. 
No one in the Department of Agriculture had indicated to Dr. Ledbetter that he could not 
issue a propagation permit. R. Vol. I, p. 147. Ledbetter Depo., p. 104, LL. 17 - 20. According to 
Dr. Ledbetter, rules were very clear, that no person could propagate deleterious exotic animals. R. 
Vol. I, p. 148. Ledbetter Depo., p. 105, LL. 6 - 8. (And by virtue of his defiiition of "person", that 
meant everyone and every entity at any time!) 
Dr. Ledbetter's November 16 letter was the very first written denial of propagation permit. 
Renzo Affidavit, 1 13. Dr. Ledbetter then re-affirmed the Department's requirements for obtaining 
a possession permit, which included spaying and neutering. R. Vol. I, pp. 117 -1 18. Dr. Ledbetter 
considered this letter as his final decision, his final sav in the matter. R. Vol. I, p. 145, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 94, LL. 23 - 25; p. 95, LL. 1 - 8. 
On December 7,2007, Renzo's counsel sent another letter to Dr. Ledbetter, stating: 
The only two reasons for the denial that I can decipher from your 
letter are that 1) because you have the authority to strictly regulate the 
possession of deleterious exotic animals in Idaho, you have 
arbitrarily chosen to do so, to the detriment of the preservation 
of Siberian tigers; and 2)  you have chosen to arbitrarily deny a 
permit to Peter Renzo on the grounds that he is an individual rather 
than consider issuing a permit to S.A.B.R.E. Foundation, a legitimate 
50l(c)(3) corporation dedicated to the preservation of Siberian tigers. 
If I have mis-characterized the reasons for the denial, I have done so 
at least in part because you did not provide a detailed explanation of 
your denial as it specifically applies to facts and circumstances of 
S.A.B.R.E. Foundation's request for a permit (emphasis added). 
* * *  
It is . . . my understanding from the statute that our initial deadline for 
filing a petition for review in this matter is December 14,2007 . . . . 
This deadline should be extended because of our timely attempt 
through this letter to exhaust our administrative remedies. This 
attempt is not frivolous or repetitious because it addresses new facts 
and seeks reconsideration of the denial, and a more detailed, factual 
explanation for the denial which was not provided in the November 
16,2007 [letter]. 
To protect our interests, we hereby demand that your response 
to this letter be submitted to us no later than Noon, December 13. 
(emphasis added). 
R. Vol. I, pp. 119 - 121. 
On December 13, the State Deputy Attorney General for the Department of Agriculture sent 
a letter to Renzo's counsel stating, ". . . we are preparing a response to the substantive issues raised 
in your December 7 correspondence, and will provide that response as soon as possible. R. Vol. I, 
p. 122. No response was ever provided. 
In December, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Judicial Review, Bingham County Case 
No. CV-2007-3 162, challenging the Department's decision to require the sterilization of Plaintiffs' 
tigers and the Department's refusal to issue a propagation permit. In February, 2008, Dr. Ledbetter 
resigned from his position as Administrator of the Division of Animal Industries. R. Vol. I, p. 147. 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 101, LL. 7 - 8. Dr. Ledbetter denies that the resignation had anything to do with 
the Renzo matter. R. Vol. I, p. 147, Ledbetter Depo, p. 102, LL. 10 - 15. 
On April 7,2008, a hearing was held on the Petition for Judicial Review. During the hearing, 
Judge Ted V. Wood, District Judge for the Seventh Judicial District, stated that "counsel for the 
Department has cited the Court to no rule, regulation, standard, criteria, or anything else that's been 
adopted pursuant to proper legal procedure by theDepartment which would authorize [the] position" 
[that the Administrator of Animal Industries can determine that absolutely no permits to propagate 
will be granted]. Judge Wood further stated that, "it does appear to this Court that the administrator 
is basically making up the rules as he goes." R. Vol. I, pp. 186 - 187, Hearing Transcript, p. 5, LL. 
19-25, and p. 6, LL. 1. 
On April 23,2008, Judge Wood issued an Order and Judgment against the Department of 
Agriculture, ruling that the Department's decision to deny a propagation permit was made in the 
absence of any specific criteria promulgated by the Department, and that the Department demanded 
spaying and neutering without established criteria allowing for such demands. R. Vol. I, pp. 189- 
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190. Judge Wood further ruled that the Department's decisions were made upon unlawful 
procedure, were arbitrary and capricious, and constituted an abuse of discretion, and that the 
substantial rights of the Foundation had been prejudiced. R. Vol. I, p. 190. Judge Wood set aside 
the Department's decision in its entirety and remanded the matter back to the Dep-ent of 
Agriculture to adopt, within a reasonable amount of time, "criteria and/or rules for which possession 
and propagation permits are issued" and to "apply these rules and criteria fairly to Petitioner's 
application" (emphasis added). R. Vol. I, p. 190. 
Inhis Memorandumopinion and Order granting theFoundation's Request for Attorney Fees 
and Costs, dated July 21, 2008, Judge Wood stated that "ISDA had no authority whatsoever for 
issuing its spaylneuter requirement (and/or refusing to issue a propagation permit) . . . ." J u d g e 
Wood further stated that, "[w]ithout standards for discerning ISDA's discretion, ISDA's decision 
is not subject to any meaningful review, thereby limiting the judiciary's role to rubberstamping 
ISDA's actions and covert reasoning." R. Vol. I, pp. 204 - 205. 
Because the Foundation was denied possession and propagation permits, it was precluded 
from building a facility for the tigers in the State of Idaho. Consequently, the sponsor that had given 
offers/consideration to Plaintiffs to f'mance and/or partner in the construction of facilities in Idaho 
to house and exhibit the tigers, withdrew its offers/consideration. R. Vol. I, p. 91. The S.A.B.R.E. 
Foundation has been in serious jeopardy of ending its operations due to losing this sponsorship and 
funding. R. Vol. I, p. 91. 
Dr. Ledbetter stated in his Affidavit filed in support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, that 
he did not have any knowledge of any contracts then existing between Renzo and any other person 
or entity concerning his possession permit or his request for a propagation permit. R. Vol. I, p. 25. 
Dr. Ledbetter admitted in his deposition, however, that any knowledge of such contracts would not 
have changed his decision any. R. Vol. I, p. 146, Ledbetter Depo., p. 99, LL. 11 - 14. 
On May 14,2008, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Tort Claim against the Department with the 
Idaho Secretary of State's Office. R. Vol. I, pp. 212 - 214. The Notice was timely filed in 
accordance with Idaho Code $6-906 from the date of Dr. Ledbetter's November 16,2007 letter. R. 
Vol. I, pp. 212 - 214. Plaintiffs received no response whatsoever to the Notice of Tort Claim from 
the Department. SABRE filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against ISDA on October 6, 
2008. On January 5,2009, ISDA filed its Motion To Dismiss with supporting memorandum and 
affidavits. R. Vol. I, pp. 1, 19. 
The district court issued its Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Defendant and Judgment on May 27,2009. R. Vol. I, p. 219. SABRE file a Notice of Appeal on 
July 7,2009. R. Vol. I, p. 254. 
11. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues before this Court on Appeal can be summarized as follows: 
1. Did the District Court err in ruling that SABRE'S Notice of Tort Clam was untimely? 
2. Did the District Court err in ruling that the ISDA was immune from suit because 
SABRE failed to raise a material issue of fact as to the Malice Requirement under LC. $6-904(1)? 
3. Did the District Court err in ruling that the ISDA was entitled to immunity under LC. 
$6-904B(3)? 
4. Did the District Court err in ruling that SABRE failed to raise material issues of fact 
with regard to its Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Claim? 
5. Did the District Court err in ruling that Dr. Ledbetter Owed No Duty to SABRE. 
6. Is the District Court's decision contrary to federal andlor other applicable law? 
7. DidtheDistrict Court err inruling that SABRE didnot show that Dr. LedbetterASDA 
owed a duty to SABRE? 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a trial court considers matters outside the pleadings on an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment and the court is required 
to afford the parties an opportunity to present material pertinent to a summary judgment motion. 
Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270,273,108 P.3d417,420 (2005). While ISDA initially filed a Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss with affidavits, the parties stipulated to hearing the matter as a summary 
judgment motion in this matter, and the district court treated the motion as a summary judgment 
motion. Standards pertaining to summary judgment decisions are there applicable here. 
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In reviewing a party's appeal of a district court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate 
court applies the same standards the district court used when it ruled on the motion Banner Life 
Insurance Co. v Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117,123, 206 P.3d 481,487 
(2009). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Banner Life Insurance Co., 
147 Idaho at 123,206 P.3d at 487. 
The appellatecourt must construe therecord in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 
2009 Opinion No. 92, Docket No. 34888. If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or 
inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. The nonmoving party must submit 
more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary 
judgment. Id. A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the fact is not sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. Instead, the 
nonmoving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there 
is a genuine issue for trial. Id. 
A trial court's findings of fact will be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); 
Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503,506,65 P.3d 525,528 (2003). The Court determines if the findings 
are support by substantial, competent evidence. Evidence in the case is substantial if "a reasonable 
trier of fact would accept it and rely on it." Id. The Court determines whether the evidence supports 
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the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Owen v. 
Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31,36,624 P.2d 413,418 (1981). The district court is not permitted to weigh 
evidence or resolve controverted factual issues. Bybee v. Clark, 188 Idaho 254,257,796 P.2d 131, 
134 (1990). 
When the appellate court addresses questions of law, the court exercises free review. It is 
not bound by the findings of the district court, and it is free to draw its own conclusions from the 
evidence which has been presented Beardv. George, 135 Idaho 685,687,23 P.3d 147,149 (2001). 
Therefore, the Court may substitute its view on a legal issue for that of the district court. Marshall 
v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 (1997). 
I1 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SABRE'S NOTICE OF TORT 
CLAIM WAS UNTIMELY 
The district court ruled that, "Renzo did not file the notice of tot claim within one-hundred 
and eighty days of the date he had knowledge of ISDA's alleged wrongdoing". The court then 
granted summaq judgment to ISDA on the grounds that Renzo's notice of tort claim was untimely. 
R. Vol. I, p. 235. The district court grounded its reasoning in Magnuson Properties Partnership v. 
City of Coeur D-Alene 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002). SABRE asserts that the facts in 
Magnuson are distinguishable from the case at hand, and that Magnuson is not controlling in this 
instance. 
Magnuson involved one issue raised by the Plaintiff, namely, reimbursement for costs 
attributable to the extension of a sewer line. Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City of Coeur D- 
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Alene, 138 Idaho at 168,59 P.3d at 973. On May 10, 1996, request for reimbursement was made 
to the City and on August 13, 1996, the reimbursement request was denied. Id. On November 7, 
1996, the City reiterated its denial. Magnuson filed a tort claim on February 18,1997. Magnuson, 
138 Idaho at 169,59 P.3d at 974, exceeding the 180 day limit based on the August 13 notice. 
The Magnuson Court found that the filing was untimely, ruling that, "[tlhe 180-day notice 
period begins to run at the occurrence of a wrongful act, even if the extent of the damages is not 
known or is unpredictable at the time, and that "[klnowledge offact which would put a reasonable 
prudent person on inquiry" triggers the 180-day period. Magnuson, 138 Idaho at 169,59 P.3d at 974, 
citing Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225,227,560 P.2d 1315,1317 (1977) and McQuillen 
v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719,722,747 P.2d 741,744 (1987). The Magnuson Court further 
found that, "[a] claimant is not required to know all the facts and details of a claim because such a 
prerequisite would allow a claimant to delay completion of their investigation before triggering the 
notice requirement. Magnuson, 138 Idaho at 170, 59 P.3d at 975, citing Mitchell v. Bingham 
Memorial Hosp., 130 Idaho 420,423,942 P.2d 544,547 (1997). 
Dr. Ledbetter's October 17, 2007 letter to Peter Renzo was in direct response to Renzo's 
Deleterious Exotic Possession Permit Application. This fact is shown clearly on the document itself. 
R. Vol. I, p. 114. While Renzo's application did indicate that animals would be used for 
propagation, as ISDA has pointed out, Renzo did not initially apply for a propagation pennit. 
Furthermore, Dr. Ledbetter's letter did not address a propagation Dermit in any way. 
It was not until after Renzo learned of the contents of the October 17,2007 letter that he 
began inquiring about a propagation permit. See R. Vol. I, pp. 88 - 89. It is therefore unreasonable 
to conclude that Renzo would have been put on with regard to a wrongful denial of a propagation 
permit by Ledbetter, before he even asked for such a permit! 
The entire sum and substance of Renzo's inquiries was to secure the appropriate permission 
from the State of Idaho so that SABRE could move its cats into the state and be allowed to breed 
them. Therefore, notice of ISDA's wrongful conduct in response to Renzo's inquiries was not 
complete until the propagation permit was denied. Prior to Dr. Ledbetter's November 16, 2007 
letter, there had been no written decision by the Department of Agriculture regarding the issuance 
of propagation permits. The October 17,2007 letter was only a partial response to Renzo's request 
and therefore must not be considered as the only wrongful act which put Renzo on notice. 
The fact that Renzo was not put on notice of ISDA's culminating wrongful act is clearly 
shown in SABRE'S counsel's letter of November 2,2007, in which he stated: 
If you have actually denied or plan to deny the issuance of a 
breedingpermit, I hereby request that you submit to me a written 
denial, with a detailed explanation for the basis of such denial within 
seven days of the date of this letter . . . . 
R. Vol. I, p. 116 
Unlike Magnuson, Renzo did not receive a complete answer to his requests until November 
16,2007. Contrary to ISDA's arguments, the November 16,2007 letter was not simply a reiteration 
of a previous denial. It contained new information regarding the denial of the propagation permit 
which had never before been put in writing by ISDA. The facts in Magnuson therefore do not 
compare with the facts in the case at hand. Renzo sought a possession permit and a propagation 
permit. It is undisputed the first written notice Renzo received of the propagation permit was on 
November 16,2007. Magnuson only involved the denial of one issue, not two issues. Magnuson 
must therefore not be utilized in an attempt to diminish or ignore the notice given to SABRE in 
Ledbetter's November 16 letter. 
Reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence 
presented with regard to notice. Reasonable people could conclude that ISDA committed two 
separate and distinct wrongful acts, the demand that SABRE'S cats be spayed and neutered on 
October 17 and the denial of the propagation permit on November 16. In this case, there is no 
question that SABRE filed a timely notice of tort claim based on the November 16 denial. For all 
of these reasons, the district court's decision that the Tort claim was untimely must be reversed. 
111 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ISDA WAS IMMUNE FROM 
SUIT BECAUSE SABRE FAILED TO RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
THE MALICE REQUIREMENT UNDER I.C. $6-904(1) 
The district court ruled that ISDA was entitled to immunity under Idaho Code $6-904(1), 
because SABRE failed to show sufficient evidence of ill will on the part of Dr. Ledbetter. R. Vol. 
I, p. 238. SABRE asserts that if the district court had not weighed the evidence, but had drawn all 
reasonable inferences in that party's favor, the district court would have found sufficient evidence 
to preclude summary judgment on this cause of action. 
A governmental entity and its employees may be liable for a claim which arises out of an 
employee's acts or omission while exercising ordinary care in reliance upon or in executing a 
statutory or regulatory function or for a claim which arises out of an employee's acts or omissions 
while exercising or failing to exercise a discretionary function, if such acts or omissions are 
performed with malice or criminal intent. Idaho Code $6-904(1). The statements of Peter Renzo 
and Rebecca Harris are sufficient to show malice on the part of Dr. Ledbetter. 
Rebecca Harris repeatedly attempted to get Dr. Ledbetter to understand the nature of the 
Foundation. Rebecca toldDr. Ledbetter that SABRE couldn't spay andneuter its cats because it was 
against the law and it would "utterly defeat any preservation or breeding programs we would attempt, 
which is part of our mission statement." Ledbetter replied that it wasn't his problem. R. Vol. I, p. 
97. Dr. Ledbetter left the undeniable impression with Rebecca that he was pickimg on the 
Foundation just because he could. Peter Renzo understood that Dr. Ledbetter was very rude to 
Rebecca and would not answer her questions. R. Vol. I, p. 90. Despite the district court's findings 
otherwise, SABRE asserts that such actions satisfy the requirements of a "wrongful act without 
justification and an "ill will", as described in Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,216,796 
P.2d. 87 (1990). R. Vol. I, p. 238. 
To determine whether SABRE raised a material issue of fact on this issue, the district court 
compared the facts found in Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990). R. 
Vol. I, p. 237 - 238. The district court outlined the vulgar and rude behavior allegedly to have 
occurred by Twin Falls County sheriffs. The district court then concluded that the conduct by Dr. 
Ledbetter pales in significance to the conduct aileged in Evans. R. Vol. I, p. 238. SABRE disagrees. 
The district court fails to mention that the central issues of Evans certainly did not involve 
a determination of malice on the part of officers. In fact, the Evans Court affirmed the district 
court's ruling on the issue of immunity in a footnote. Furthermore, the district court did not mention 
Mr. Evans' admission in his deposition that none of the deputies used profane language or restricted 
the Evanses from coming and going. Evans, 118 Idaho at 212 - 213, 796 P.2d 89 - 90 (1990). 
Obviously, the allegations of the Evanses contradicted themselves leading the court to a finding of 
no ill-will. 
In this case, the statements of Harris and Renzo do not contradict each other. Furthermore 
the statements have never been refuted by ISDA. SABRE submits that the statements demonstrate 
more than just stubbornness or hardheadedness on the part of Dr. Ledbetter. The statements are 
sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to malice, thereby precluding summary judgment on 
this issue. 
IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ISDA WAS ENTITLED TO 
IMMUNITY UNDER I.C. $6-904B(3) 
The district court ruled that ISDA was entitled to summary judgment under Idaho Code $6- 
904B(3) because "Renzo cites to no authority that would create a duty on the party of Ledbetter to 
each deleterious animal propagation permit applicant." R. Vol. I, p. 242. To reach this conclusion, 
the district court relied on Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Company, 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 
(2004). R. Vol. I, p. 241. 
In Nelson, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Nelsons' 
negligence claims against Fremont County and the county building inspector because the Nelsons 
could cite to no authority that would create a duty on the part of the building inspector to each 
building permit applicant. R. Vol. I, p. 241. SABRE asserts its claims are distinguishable from 
Nelson because there is evidence in the record creating a duty on the ISDA toward SABRE. 
As the district court pointed out, Judge Ted V. Wood ruled in April 2008, that ISDA's 
decision against SABRE exceeded the Department's statutory authority, was made upon unlawful 
procedure, was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and that the substantial rights of 
SABRE had been prejudiced. R. Vol. I, p. 239. What the district court did not point out is that 
Judge Wood also ordered that when ISDA had adopted criteria and/or rules for which possession and 
propagation permits, it was to apply the mles and criteria "fairly to Petitioner's application" 
(emphasis added). R. Vol. I, pp. 70,190. This is the crux of ISDA's duty toward SABRE, to apply 
themles for the issuance of possession and propagation mles fairly. It is only reasonable to conclude 
that this duty existed before Judge Wood issued his Order. Evidently, Judge Wood determined it 
necessary to emphasize this duty in the form of an order. It is however, beyond reason, to conclude 
that ISDA had no such duty to treat SABRE fairly before the Order. 
Under Idaho Code $6-904C(1), "gross negligence" is defined as "the doing or failing to do 
an act which a reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a 
minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such 
act and that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the hannful consequences to others". 
The record is replete with evidence showing that ISDA's treatment of SABRE'S application 
constituted gross negligence. Despite the fact that Dr. Ledbetter did not have sufficient criteria to 
assess SABRE'S application, Ledbetter's failure to treat SABRE fairly very clearly demonstrated his 
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to SABRE. 
Ledbetter compared Renzo's situation directly with that of Jerry Korn. A reasonable person 
in a similar situation and of similar responsibility, with a minimum of contemplation, would never 
judge Renzo's application based on the actions of Jerry Korn. Peter Renzo respected the law and 
did his utmost to comply with the law. He was licensed and in good standing with the U.S.D.A. 
whereas Korn had lost his U.S.D.A. license. Peter applied for a possession permit prior to bringing 
the animals into the State. Renzo never violated Idaho law pertaining to the possession of his 
animals. His operation never involved the improper transfer of exotic animals within the State. The 
operation never involved the death of endangered animal, as with Kom or Ligertown. Peter had 
every intention of building a faciiily that complied with state and federal requirements. 
Dr. Ledbetter did not speak with Renzo before making his initial decision. He refused to 
listen and to consider the arguments of Peter Renzo, Rebecca Harris, and Renzo's counsel, and he 
did not speak with any third party about how Renzo's breeding could benefit the species. Moreover, 
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Dr. Ledbetter was totally oblivious to the actions of the Tautphaus Park Zoo which was breediig 
lions in violation of the rules at the verv same time the Department was dealing with Korn and 
immediately arior to Dr. Ledbetter's decision against the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation. 
A reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility as that of Dr. 
Ledbetter, with a minimum of contemplation, would be inescapably drawn to recognize that the 
requirement of sterilizing an endangered species, which SABRE sought to preserve and protect in 
Idaho, would cause irreparable harm to SABRE. Dr. Ledbetter's actions most certainly did 
constitute gross negligence. 
Idaho Code $6-904C(2) provides that "reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is "present only 
when a person intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of 
harm to another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." The 
evidence in the record establishes that the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation would have generated substantial 
revenues for preservation, education and breeding programs had it been allowed to enter the State. 
The evidence further establishes that the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation was severely and irreparably harmed 
when it curtailed its operations in Nevada and then lost its sponsorship. 
By demanding spayinglneutering and refusing to issue a propagation permit as allowed by 
the State, Dr. Ledbetter did in fact create an unreasonable risk of harm to S.A.B.R.E. Foundation. 
That risk did involve a high degree of probability that harm would result. The harm caused by 
refusing breeding permits to a Foundation whose mission involves the preservation of a endangered 
species through breeding and who draws its revenues in part through breeding is indeed great. The 
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evidence in the record does establish that as aresult of the breach of ISDA's duty to SABRE through 
its reckless, willful and wanton conduct, SABRE was irreparably harmed. 
v 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SABRE FAILED TO RAISE 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WITH REGARD TO ITS TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE CLAIM 
The district court outlined the elements needed to establish a claim for intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage, namely (1) the existence of a valid economic 
expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferor, (3) intentional interference 
inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond 
the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been 
disrupted. R. Vol. I, p. 242. The district court then found that SABRE had satisfied the first two 
elements, but had not satisfied the third and fourth elements. The district court made no comment 
on the fifth element. R. Vol. I, p. 243. SABRE asserts that the district court erred in finding that 
SABRE failed to satisfy the third and fourth elements of this cause of action. 
Regarding the third element, the district court found that "[olther than the fact that Ledbetter 
apparently denied Renzo's permit application arbitrarily, and without an ISDA guidelines, Renzo 
has produced no evidence which would tend to show that Ledbetter intended to interfere with 
Renzo's prospective economic advantage." R. Vol. I, p. 243. The district court failed to address 
SABRE's arguments supported by the case cited in SABRE's Memorandum in Opposition, 
Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (1999). R. Vol. I, p. 79 - 80. 
Addressing the element of intent, The Highland Enterprises Court stated: 
It is reasonable to infer from the evidence of the appellants' conduct 
presented at trial that the conduct was substantially certain to interfere 
with an economic advantage. The substantially certain aspect of 
appellants' conduct allows a finding of intent. Even more, regardless 
of the assertion that Highland was not the intended target of their 
activities and saving the trees was the ultimate objective, intent can 
be shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's intended 
purpose and desire, but known to him to be a necessary consequence 
of his action. A reasonable conclusion from the appellants' activities 
is that even if they intended only to harm the &rest Service and 
preserve the CoveMallard area, a necessary consequence of their 
actions would be that those constructing the roads would suffer 
financially. 
Highland, 133 Idaho at 340- 341,986 P.2d at 1006-1007. 
Dr. Ledbetter recognized Renzo as a businessman. He thought he was breeding the tigers 
for his own benefit. Dr. Ledbetter was familiar with Yellowstone Bear World and had a lot of 
interaction with its owner. Dr. Ledbetter thought it was reasonable fortheowner to charge entry fees 
as he was a businessman. Rebecca Hanis informed Dr. Ledbetter of an investor the Foundation had 
lined up who wanted to build a facility that would be open to the public, similar to Bear World, with 
a Tiger theme that would bring tourism and business to the community. The necessary consequences 
of Dr. Ledbetter's actions would be that those denied access to enter Idaho and build a breeding and 
educational facility would suffer financially. Thus, the substantially certain aspect of Ledbetter's 
conduct allows a finding of intent. 
Furthermore, Dr. Ledbetter's intent can be shown because his interference was incidental 
to the intended purpose and desire to prohibit the propagation of deleterious exotic animals in the 
State of Idaho. The interference was known to him to be a necessary consequence of his action. 
This is proven by Dr. Ledbetter's deposition statements that while he did not have any knowledge 
of any contracts then existing between Renzo and any other person or entity, knowledge of such 
contracts would not have changed his decision any. R. Vol. I, p. 25,146, Ledbetter Depo., p. 99, LL. 
11 - 14. In sum, Dr. Ledbetter would have interfered regardless of economic advantage of 
SABRE. All in all, sufficient evidence was vroduced to the district court to establish intent on the 
part of Dr. Ledbetter, 
Regarding the fourth element, the district court stated: 
Furthermore, Renzo has not raised facts which would tend to support 
atheory that Ledbetter's denial of a propagation permit was wrongfu1 
by some measure beyond the fact of the interfefence itself. As noted 
above, this Court finds that Renzo has not shown a duty on the part 
of ISDA, and thus Renzo cannot establish that Ledbetter's conduct 
was grossly negligent. 
R. Vol. I, p. 243 
Taken to its limits, the district court's statements imply that in the interference of SABRE'S 
economic advantage, Dr. Ledbetter could engage in whatever grossly negligent conduct he desired 
to engage in, no matter what consequences resulted for SABRE, and the fourth element would not 
be met because Dr. Ledbetter owed no duty to SABRE. This is absurd! Again, the district court 
ignores the Highland case. In Highland, the contractor for construction of forest road brought an 
action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against environmental 
protestors. Highland, 133 Idaho at 334, 986 P.2d at 1000. If the district court's analysis were 
applied to the facts in Highland, the result would be that as long as the protesters were government 
workers, they could do anything they wanted and get away with it because they owed no duty to the 
construction company. 
The fourth element is actually met if there is a showing that the interference is wrongful by 
some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, such as interference by improper means. 
Highland, 133 Idaho at 338,986 P.2d at 1004. SABRE has satisfied this element by establishing 
the improper means used by Dr. Ledbetter in his interference. The improper means were recognized 
by Judge Wood when he found Dr. Ledbetter was apparently making up rules and denying permits 
when the statute and rules provided for permits. Aside from just denying the possession andlor 
breeding permits, Dr. Ledbetter utilized improper means by concocting his own rules which led to 
the termination of SABRE'S economic expectancy. The wrongful measure element certainly exists 
here. 
The final element of the tort is "resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been 
disrupted." Highland, 133 Idaho at 338,986 P.2d at 1004. The uncontroverted evidence establishes 
that SABRE was severely damaged by the actions of Dr. Ledbetter. Thus, all of the elements of the 
tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage have been satisfied and the district court's 
decision must be reversed on this cause of action. 
VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DR. LEDBETTER OWED NO 
DUTY TO SABRE 
In reviewing the "economic loss" rule, the district court found that generally, a party owes 
no duty to exercise due care to avoid purely economic loss. R. Vol. I, p. 248. The court also found 
that a duty is created when a "special relationship" existed between the parties. This occurs where 
one of the parties holds itself out to the public as performing a specialized function and induces 
reliance on superior knowledge and skill. R. Vol. I, p. 248. The court, however, found no "special 
relationship" between ISDA and SABRE and that Ledbetter owed no duty to SABRE. R. Vol. I, p. 
248. 
The district court's decision and judgment were issued approximately three months before 
the Supreme Court's decision in Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., Docket No. 35218 (August 
24,2009). Aardema dealt primarily with Idaho's economic loss rule and is extremely instructive 
here. In Aardema, the Aardema Dairy entered into a contract with U. S. Dairy systems for the 
installation and maintenance of an automated milking system. Aadema filed suit alleging negligent 
design, installation and maintenance of the milking system which resulted in decreased milk 
production, quality and damage to the cows. Defendants filed summary judgment motions alleging 
that Aardema Dairy's negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule. The district court 
ruled that the economic loss rule did not bar Aardema's negligence action. The primary dispute 
before the Supreme Court then became whether there was an injury to Aardema's property or 
whether the damages were based purely on economic loss. Aardema, No. 35218. 
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The Aardema Court noted that while a plaintiff generally may not recover in tort where the 
sole allegation is that the defendant prevented the plaintiff from gaining a purely economic 
advantage, damage to person or property, when the property is not the subject of the transaction is 
recoverable under a negligence theory. The issue then arose as to what was the proper subject of the 
transaction. U.S. Dairy argued that the cows were the subject matter of the transaction, but the Court 
disagreed, concluding that the miKmg machines were the subject of the transaction. The Aardema 
Court further stated: 
Evidence existed that the wiring at the Aardema Dairy was faulty and 
that faulty wiring would lead to improperly operation miKing 
equipment. An expert opined that "if the pulsatory isn't working 
properly . . . the blood circulation through the . . . teat end wouldn't 
be adequate and it could injure the cow." (Emphasis added) 
Aardema Dairy also presented evidence that its loss extended to 
"reduced milk production, loss of price premium from reduced mil 
quality, loss of dairy capital and loss of present value" all allegedly 
stemming from the physical damage to the cattle. On remand, if the 
only damage that is produced is in the fonn of lost milk production, 
quality and profits and not actual physical damage to the cows then 
this is purely economic loss; that is the failure of the milking 
equipment to produce the products and profits anticipated by 
Aardema Dairy. 
Aardema, No. 35218. 
Finally the Aardema Court addressed intentional acts towards animals as follows: 
"It is a long-held leal maxim that animals are tangible property and 
that intentional acts leading to the destruction or loss of such chattels 
give rise to a cause of action[.]" Oppenheimer Jndus., Jnc. V. Johnson 
Cattle Co., Jnc., 112 Idaho 423, 426, 732 P.2d 661, 664 (1986). 
Economic loss is distinguishable from property damage, which would 
be recoverable under a tort claim. 
* * *  
This Court has not defined the "subject of the transaction," instead 
relying on factual comparisons from previous decisions. (Citations 
omitted) This line of case delineates a clear pattern that this Court has 
implicitly defined the "subject of the transaction" by the subject 
matter of the contract. 
Aardema No. 35218. 
As stated in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, while 
the Foundation sustained economic losses, it ultimately lost its right to possess and breed tigers in 
Idaho, which right Judge Wood recognized as prejudiced. R. 83,190; also see TR. Vol. I, p. 29, LL. 
The subject matter of this case is the denial of the propagation permits and consequential 
damages suffered by SABRE. As is Aardema, the animals themselves are not the subject matter of 
the suit. SABRE did not contract with ISDA for the purchase of tigers. SABRE'S damages flowed 
from SABRE'S diminished property right in the tigers. This diminished right directly resulted from 
ISDA's demands that the tigers must be harmed before entering the State. 
Sterilization of endangered species can only mean one thing, the non-preservation of the 
species. Even the Idaho Falls zoo superintendent recognized that the birth of the lion cub at that 
facility, in the larger picture, meant the preservation of a species. SABRE suffered a definite non- 
economic loss, namely, its inability to further the breeding of an endangered species through the 
unlawful and arbitrary actions of ISDA. 
Components of SABRE's tort claim are therefore not purely economic loss. SABRE's 
interests were based in the preservation of a species. While its economic interests were a means to 
and end, the economic interests were by no means the end. Because this non-economic component 
was not recognized by the district court, the court's decision must be reversed. 
As discussed earlier, ISDA did owe a duty to SABRE to treat it fairly in the review of 
SABRE's application. SABRE asserts that duty was an integral part of the "special relationship" 
between ISDA and SABRE as defied in Dufin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Assn., 126 Idaho 1002, 
1008, 895 P.2d 1195,1201. 
The Department of Agriculture performed the specialized function of granting breeding 
permits; it is the only entity which can issue breeding permits. By way of the rules then existing, the 
Department presented the position that it would give breed permits to qualified applicants. Based 
on the rules, it induced reliance by applicants that a permit would be issued if all requirements were 
met. SABRE reasonably relied on that reliance and performed all the requirements then existing to 
obtain such a permit, all to its detriment. ISDA then had a duty, based upon the rules and criteria 
then existing, to fairly assess and process SABRE's application. Dr. Ledbetter refused to grant a 
permit, despite the reasonable information presented to him, and thereby breached the duty imposed 
upon the Department. The breach of that duty resulted in severe losses, economic and non-economic 
for SABRE. 
VII 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO FEDERAL AND/OR 
OTHER APPLICABLE LAW. 
In addressed the harm suffered by SABRE, the district court stated: 
The fact that Ledbetter denied Renzo a permit to propagate the tigers 
may ve alienated Renzo's ultimate purpose, but it did not interfere 
with the economic advantage Renzo could have enjoined had he been 
able to abandon his breeding plans. 
* * * 
The harm at issue, according to Renzo, is that Renzo was precluded 
from building a facility for his tigers in the state of Idaho. (Footnote 
and citation omitted). However, Ledbetter's conduct, even if this 
Court assumes it was reckless, willful and wanton, did not preclude 
Renzo from building a facility for his tigers in the state of Idaho. It 
only precluded Renzo from breeding his tigers in the state of Idaho. 
Accordingly, this Court finds that Renzo has not raised issues of 
material fact which would stave of summary judgment as to Renzo's 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 243 - 245. 
Prior to these rulings, the Court had received the affidavit testimony that Rebecca wanted to 
make sure that Dr. Ledbetter's request that the Foundation spay and neuter endangered species 
without just cause constituted a violationof federal law. Through its rulings that SABREcould have 
avoided economic loss by simply sterilizing an endangered species, the district court irnpliedly 
promoted the diminishment of an endangered species for economic gain. The district court seems 
to suggest that if SABRE was that interested in making money, it should have gone ahead and 
violated federal law, and abandon its mission, to make money. The implications of the district 
court's statements seem to fly in the face of federal laws promoting the preservation of endangered 
species. For these reasons alone, the district court's decision is improper and must be reversed and 
remanded. 
IX 
CONCLUSION 
SABRE has presented sufficient and substantial evidence in this case to show that it filed 
its tort claim timely, that ISDA is not immune fromliability, that it raised issues of material fact with 
regard to its tortious interference with its economic advantage claim, that ISDA and Dr. Ledbetter 
did owe a duty to SABRE, that SABRE'S claims are not precluded by the economic loss rule, and 
that the district court's rulings fly in the face of federal laws promoting the preservation of 
endangered species. For these reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the district court's 
Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment inFavor of Defendant and correspondmg Judgment 
be reversed. 
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